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ABSTRACT
The use of intermediate translators in the Institutional File
System presents the problem of authenticating the translator to
the file server where the client's private key is not known to
the translator.  We have implemented a modification to the
Kerberos authentication exchange that allows our translators
to securely acquire the rights necessary for them to access files
and other services on behalf of their clients.
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Introduction
The Institutional File System (IFS) [1] is a
large, heterogeneous distributed file system
developed at the Center for Information
Technology Integration (CITI) and based on
AFS [2].  Authentication in AFS between
clients and servers is provided by the
Kerberos Authentication System [3].
Eventually we expect to support tens of
thousands of file system clients.  While
many of these clients are UNIX
workstations capable of participating
directly in AFS and Kerberos services,
many others are personal computers (mostly
Macintosh or IBM PC), which may not
have the necessary resources to support AFS
directly.  These clients obtain file services
from translators  that translate IFS services
into services the client can understand.
For example, a Macintosh may want to
access the IFS through the AppleTalk
Filing Protocol (AFP) [4].  In this case, the
translator will accept file requests from the
Macintosh in AFP form, communicate with
the IFS server to satisfy the requests, and
present the file back to the Macintosh in
AFP form.
The translator is a separate Kerberos
principal, situated between the client and
the file server.  The client communicates
only with the translator, and not with the
Kerberos authentication server or the file
server.  The translator also acts as an
intermediate file server, and caches files
for the client [5].  The network connections
among these principals is shown in Figure 1.
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The use of translators presents an
authentication problem.  The translator
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does not have access to the client's private
key, yet it must be able to authenticate
itself to the IFS server in such a way that it
can perform file system operations on
behalf of the client.  We have solved this
problem through the use of an intermediate
authentication service [6].  This paper
describes the additions we have made to
the Kerberos Version 4 authentication
exchange to support the use of translators.
Goals
We wanted to preserve all of the
guarantees that Kerberos provides to its
clients.  In particular, we assume the
existence of attackers, hostile users who
attempt to impersonate others in order to
gain unauthorized access to files [7].  We
assume that an attacker has physical
access both to the network and to a
workstation capable of reading any
message from the network and sending any
message to any host.  We also assume that
the attacker has full knowledge of the
network protocols.
Clients must be able to use IFS services
without being required to communicate
with any part of IFS except through a
translator.  Some clients may not even have
TCP/IP, which is currently the only way to
communicate directly with the Kerberos
servers.
Translators must not share keys with
clients, and in particular must not store,
acquire, or use client private keys.  This
restriction simplifies key distribution and
limits the damage should a translator
become compromised.  Translators are
Kerberos principals, and therefore have
their own private keys.
We wanted to minimize the changes
necessary for clients to gain access to the
IFS.  Where client software already has
hooks in place for access controls, we have
used those hooks whenever possible.
And we wanted to avoid changing the file
servers at all.  The global AFS community
contains many servers over which we have
no control; we want our users to have access
to these servers without making special
arrangements ahead of time.
Other Approaches
Neuman [8] describes a way to use proxy
authentication to delegate authorization
for use of a service to a third party.
Kerberos Version 5 has features added to it
to provide better support for restricted
proxies.  This method is not directly useful
for us, because it requires that the client
acquire a ticket directly from Kerberos,
then grant a restricted ticket (a proxy) to
the translator.  Our clients must be able to
gain access to their files by communicating
only with the translator and not directly
with either the Kerberos or file system
services.
Blakley [9] considers four options for the
integration of PC class machines with AFS
servers.  His requirements are more
restrictive than ours.  In particular, he
requires that the client machines not run
any modified software, and that users of
the translator have identities separate
from their identities as users of direct AFS
clients.  He proposes that all users of the
translator be members of a separate
authentication realm, and that the
translator be the authentication server for
that realm.
Unlike Blakley, we are willing to make
additions to client software where
necessary to meet our other objectives,
especially in the authentication system.
More importantly, we prefer that our user's
identities be the same whether they access
AFS directly or through a translator.
The Authentication Exchange
The end result of Kerberos authentication is
that the client acquires a (random) session
k e y  and a ticket with which it can
communicate with the server.  The session
key and ticket are issued to the client by a
Jim Rees
Center for Information Technology Integration 3
ticket-granting service.  We use the
following notation to describe message
exchanges:
a®b: message passed from a to b
c client
x translator
s server
# timestamp
tgs ticket-granting service
as authentication service
Ka a's private key
Ka,b session key for a and b
{p,q}Ka p,q encrypted in a's key
IPa a's IP address
Ta,b a's ticket to use b
(a,b,IPa,#,lifetime,Ka,b )
Aa authenticator for a (a,IPa,#)
IPa is the IP address of the workstation at
which Kerberos principal a wants to gain
access to the file server.
The complete ticket acquisition sequence for
the normal client-server case, not involving
translators, can be written as:
c®as: c,tgs
c¬as: {Kc,tgs ,{Tc,tgs}Ktgs}Kc
c®tgs: s,{Tc,tgs}Ktgs,{Ac }Kc,tgs
c¬tgs: {{Tc,s}Ks,Kc,s}Kc,tgs
c®s: {Ac }Kc,s ,{Tc,s}Ks
The goal of intermediate authentication is
to provide the translator with the session
key Kc,tgs  and the ticket-granting ticket
{Tc,tgs}Ktgs.  This must be done without the
client communicating directly with the
authentication server.  Also, the IP address
in the ticket must be that of the translator,
not that of the client, as the server would
otherwise reject requests from the
translator.
Our modified Kerberos authentication
proceeds as follows.  First, client c indicates
to translator x that it wants x to acquire
tickets on its behalf.
c®x: c,tgs (1)
Now x gets a ticket-granting ticket from
authentication server as:
x®as: x,tgs (2)
x¬as: {Kx,tgs ,{Tx,tgs}Ktgs}Kx (3)
Next x gets a service ticket for c.  Note x is
acting as a client and c as a server for the
purpose of mutual authentication.
x®tgs: c,{Tx,tgs}Ktgs,{Ax }Kx,tgs (4)
x¬tgs: {{Tx,c}Kc ,Kx,c}Kx,tgs (5)
Now x has the session key Kx,c that it will
use to communicate securely with the client.
Next x  gets a ticket-granting ticket on
behalf of c.  Kerberos principals are not tied
to any particular IP address, and tickets are
encrypted in the client's key, so it is safe
(and not unusual) for the translator to do
this.
x®as: c,tgs (6)
x¬as: {Kc,tgs ,{Tc,tgs}Ktgs}Kc (7)
Now x has the necessary session key and
the ticket-granting ticket, but they are
encrypted by the client's private key,
which the translator does not have.  The
translator also needs to authenticate itself
to c .  To do this, it generates an
authenticator Ax .
The translator now sends three things to
the client.  The first is the session key and
ticket-granting ticket that it got in step 7
above.  The second is the ticket Tx,c that it
got in step 5, and the third is the
authenticator Ax , encrypted by the session
key Kx,c.
x®c: {Kc,tgs ,{Tc,tgs}Ktgs}Kc ,
{Tx,c}Kc ,{Ax}Kx,c (8)
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The client uses its private key Kc to decrypt
the ticket Tx,c.  This ticket contains the
client-translator session key Kx,c that c
will use to communicate with x.  The client
uses this key to decrypt the authenticator
Ax and verify x's identity.
The client now has the ticket-granting
ticket and session key that x needs.  It uses
its private key to decrypt these, and re-
encrypts them in the client-translator
session key Kx,c.  Then it sends them back to
x.
c®x: {Kc,tgs ,{Tc,tgs}Ktgs}Kx,c (9)
Now x has the session key Kc,tgs and the
ticket-granting ticket {Tc,tgs}Ktgs, and can
acquire a service ticket and communicate
with the file server in the normal way.
x®tgs: s,{Tc,tgs}Ktgs,{Ac }Kc,tgs (10)
x¬tgs: {{Tc,s}Ks,Kc,s}Kc,tgs (11)
x®s: {Tc,s}Ks,{Ac }Kc,s (12)
Figure 2 shows a summary of the complete
sequence of transactions.  In this figure, the
vertical lines represent the principals
involved, and the horizontal lines
represent messages.  A message enclosed in a
box represents encryption, with the key
written above the box.
Experience and Conclusions
Translators must be able to act as Kerberos
principals to exchange secure data (keys
and tickets) with their clients, so the
requirement that the translators have
their own private keys seems unavoidable.
This authentication method is in daily use
on several translators serving dozens of
workstations here at CITI.  We use
translators with third-party authentica-
tion to provide AFS file services to all of
our Macintosh computers and NFS clients.
We also use intermediate caching servers
with third-party authentication for AFS
clients, for example to provide file services
to a set of machines located on the remote
end of a low-speed network connection.
Future Work
We plan to use this authentication scheme
for several additional types of translators
in the future.  We would also like to use it
for services in addition to remote file
access, for example to obtain tickets for
mail or printing service on a remote server
machine.
Jim Rees
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